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ESTOPPEL: INACTION BY JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
HELD A BAR TO SUBSEQUENT CRIMINAL ANTI-
TRUST ACTION
ALTHOUGH historically the Government could not be estopped by
the acts of its agents,1 increased Government activity has exposed
the inequity of this rule where persons act in reliance on official
advice. Hence courts have recently allowed the rule to be relaxed
in civil and administrative proceedings.2 In United States v. Asso-
ciated Gen. Contractors of America,3 however, previous Government
inaction was held to be a basis for estopping the Justice Department
from prosecuting a criminal action for the violation of an antitrust
statute.
A trade association of building contractors was indicted in
Associated Gen. Contractors for an alleged violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.4 Ten or eleven years earlier the Government had
investigated the Association's bidding practices, but no indictment,
warning, or statement had been issued.6 On the basis of these facts,
the federal district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on
2 See Walker-Hill Co. v. United States, 162 F.2d 259, 263 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 771 (1947); United States v. Globe Indem. Co., 94 F.2d 576, 578 (2d Cir. 1938);
Brown v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 132, 133 (S.D. Mo. 1952). See generally DAvis,
ADMI1NW5TivE LAw § 17.01 (1959); Berger, Estoppel Against The Government, 21 U.
CHI. L. REv. 680 (1954); Pillsbury, -Estoppel Against The Government, 13 Bus. LAw.
508 (1958); Comment, 44 CALIF. L. Rav. 340 (1956); 34 VA. L. REv. 477 (1948).
2 See, e.g., Smale & Robinson, Inc. v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 457, 465 (S.D. Cal.
1954); DAvis, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 17.03; Pillsbury, supra note 1, at 514.
'238 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. La. 1964).
'"Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal
." Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
The Government alleged that the Association's members had "combined to advo-
cate, use and implement a 'single bid' system" when submitting competitive bids on
construction projects. 238 F. Supp. 273, 274 (E.D. La. 1964). The Association's
"Bidding Rule C" provided that the members should boycott and refuse to submit
competitive bids on construction projects where separate bids from subcontractors
were accepted. All items necessary to complete the job had to be included in bids
submitted by Association Members. Id. at 276 & n.5. The Government charged that
this bidding rule would restrain general and subcontractors from freely competing for
contracts, thereby depriving owners of building projects of the benefit of free competi-
tion. Id. at 276 & n.6.
'Evidence of the investigation was provided in a letter written by the defendant's
counsel to an attorney of the Department of Justice and introduced, without qualifica-
tion, by the Government when challenging the timeliness of the defendant's motion
as to the legality of the grand jury. Id. at 279.
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its own motion applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel against
the Government and dismissed the indictment. While recognizing
that estoppel generally is inapplicable against the Government in
criminal cases, the court relied on the exception that the Govern-
ment will be estopped by "some sound public policy." According
to the court, the Government's "acquiescence" in the Association's
bidding practice had lured and induced the Association into the
present violation and, if equitable estoppel were not invoked, the
Government's conduct "could impair confidence on the part of our
citizens in their public institutions." 7
Federal courts have permitted estoppel as a defense against the
Government if an agent thereof has been vested with authority to
bind the Government and acted within the scope of his authority.8
As an agent does not have authority to bind the Government con-
trary to law, it has been generally held that estoppel is not a defense
in a criminal prosecution for the violation of a statute.9 In rare
6 238 F. Supp. at 280. The court cited United States ex rel. Demarois v. Farrell, 87
F.2d 957 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 683 (1937), for the proposition that the
Government may be estopped to enforce its criminal laws only by "some sound public
policy, such as when its officers have induced or lured the defendant into the com-
mission of a criminal act." Id. at 962 (dictum). The words lure and induce would
appear to refer to the doctrine of entrapment, and, indeed, the Farrell case cites as
authority Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), a basic entrapment case. En-
trapment applies only when officers of the law lure one into committing a crime he
would not otherwise have committed. See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 921-26 (1957).
When the criminal design does not originate with the accused but with the govern.
ment officers, the Government is estopped to prosecute. Newman v. United States,
299 Fed. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1924). The better view in Associated Gen. Contractors
would seem to be that the criminal design could not have originated with the Govern-
ment merely because they investigated a preexisting bidding practice.
7238 F. Supp. at 280. It has been suggested that confidence in the Government is
more important than a flexible administration and the deterrent to the commission
of public fraud provided by immunity from estoppel. See Berger, supra note 1, at
684, 707. Moreover, it is argued that in reality, estoppel can be applied without
impairing governmental efficiency. See Comment, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 340, 341, 351
(1956).
8Smale & Robinson, Inc. v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 457, 464, 465 (S.D. Cal.
1954); see Federal Crop Ins. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); In the Matter of Higgin-
botham, 221 F. Supp. 839, 840 (W.D. Pa. 1963); Berger, supra note 1, at 687-88.
The distinction is often made between acts of the Government in its proprietary
capacity and those in its sovereign capacity, estoppel applying in the former instance
but not in the latter. See cases cited in Berger, supra note 1, at 681 n.7. However, if
absence of agency authority is the basis of immunity from estoppel, the form in which
the Government functions should be immaterial. See Federal Crop Ins. v. Merrill,
supra at 384; Berger, supra note 1, at 686.
9 McDonald v. United States, 89 F.2d 128, 138 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 697
(1937); United States v. Bridges, 86 F. Supp. 922, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1949); Sigmon v. Com-
monwealth, 207 Ky. 786, 789, 270 S.W. 40, 42 (1925). See Smale & Robinson, Inc. v.
United States, supra note 8, at 464; United States v. Shubert, 14 F.R.D. 471, 474
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instances, however, estoppel has been invoked against state and fed-
eral governments where the facts indicate reliance on an express
opinion or statement of advice sought by the defendants.' 0 Never-
theless, the Associated Gen. Contractors case is the first case in
which estoppel in a criminal action has been predicated on Gov-
ernment inaction. As such, it appears contrary to a decision of the
Supreme Court that the Government cannot be estopped from in-
stituting criminal antitrust proceedings even though government
agents aware of the facts have remained silent and taken no action."
On the basis of this analysis alone, it would appear that the court's
(S.D.N.Y. 1953); Western Surgical Supply Co. v. Affleck, 110 Cal. App. 2d 388, 392, 242
P.2d 929, 932 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Camenetti v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 52 Cal. App.
2d 321, 326, 126 P.2d 165, 168 (Dist. Ct App. 1942).
Even if the person most directly injured consented to the offense, its character as a
public wrong cannot be changed, and the public cannot be prevented from obtaining
the redress to which it is entitled. See State v. Burnette, 242 N.C. 164, 170, 87 S.E.2d
191, 195 (1955); Davis v. State, 70 Tex. Crim. 524, 531, 258 S.W. 288, 290 (1913);
Martin v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 1009, 1018-19, 37 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1946).
10 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (conviction under antipicketing statute
precluded by reliance on express advice of local police official); People v. Ferguson,
134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P.2d 965 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933) (conviction for violation of state
securities law reversed because of reliance on advice of Commissioner of Corporations);
Arnold Constable Corp., 55 F.T.C. 577 (1958). In Western Surgical Supply Co. v.
Affieck, 110 Cal. App. 2d 388, 242 P.2d 929 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952) the California court,
although not expressly overruling Ferguson, rejected the notion that penal laws could
be waived by estoppel.
11 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225-28 (1940). Charged
with price fixing in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), the defendant offered evidence to prove that the
Petroleum Administrative Board knew of and acquiesced in their buying programs.
The Court held this evidence would provide no immunity to the defendant. Perhaps
this case can be distinguished from the instant case, in that during the beginning of
the Socony conspiracy §§ 3 (a) and 5 of the National Industrial Recovery Act exempted
any code or agreement approved by the President from prosecution for violation of
the antitrust laws. 310 U.S. at 225-27, 228 n.60. The Court noted that the defendants
could not plead the Government's acquiescence as a bar to prosecution because Congress
had specified the only method of securing immunity which would suffice. However,
under § 2 (c), the NIRA grant of immunity was terminated before the conspiracy, and
the Court did not consider the posibility that this would revive estoppel.
The Associated Gen. Contractors court did not consider Socony until its opinion on
the Government's motion for reconsideration, 238 F. Supp. 273, 283 (E.D. La. 1965).
In distinguishing this case, the court stated that the presence of a special immunity
provision suspending application of the antitrust laws would have alerted the de-
fendant that his conduct was forbidden in the absence of obtaining formal immunity,
whereas in the present case the defendants could not be expected to know of their
violation. This reasoning seems erroneous in that it assumes the Socony defendant
could have been expected to determine that his activity was in violation of the anti-
trust laws and would require the special immunity. See United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., supra at 227; cf. United States v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 353
U.S. 586, 590 (1957); Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1957);
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 202 (1939).
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application of the law to the facts of this case was technically errone-
ous.
From a policy point of view, some might urge that the decision
was justifiable because criminal sanctions are inappropriate mea-
ures for antitrust violations in that the uncertainty regarding the
law's proscriptions should limit antitrust enforcement to construc-
tive measures which would "alter the business situation rather than
punish unwitting violators."'1 2 However, the criminal sanctions of
the Sherman Act have withstood constitutional challenges based on
vagueness,' 3 and it is believed that the Justice Department institutes
criminal actions only where the law is clear, well settled, and the
facts reveal a flagrant offense.' 4 Moreover, in the Associated Gen.
Contractors case the Justice Department alleged that the bid-rigging
practices of the Association were tantamount to a group boycott,1"
which has been clearly delineated as a per se violation of the act."0
Thus, the court's decision in Associated Gen. Contractors rests
primarily on the court's determination that the defendants had justi-
fiably relied to their detriment on the previous inaction of the
Government. The opinion failed to consider, however, many reasons
why the Government might be unwilling or unable to prosecute
an antitrust case. Inaction at an earlier stage may have been neces-
sitated by evidentiary problems, or the extent of commerce affected
by the violation may not have been sufficient to merit protracted
litigation.17 Moreover, it is physically impossible for the Justice
1 2 see ScnwARrz, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 21 (2d cd. 1959).
Since the Sherman Act is written in broad terms and modern market patterns are
complex, it may be difficult for a businessman to predict in advance whether a
projected practice will violate the act. Arr'y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRusT REP. 349
(1955).
13See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1913); United States v. New
Departure Mfg. Co., 204 Fed. 107, 114 (W.D.N.Y. 1913); United States v. Winslow, 195
Fed. 578, 583-84 (D. Mass. 1912), arfd, 227 U.S. 202 (1913); United States v. American
Naval Stores Co., 186 Fed. 592, 593 (S.D. Ga. 1909).
- See KINTNER, AN ANTITRusr P IMER 21 (1964); ATr'Y GEN. NATL COMM. ANTITRUSr
RE.P. 351 (1955).
'r See 238 F. Supp. at 276.
10 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211, 212 (1959);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM.
ANTrnusT RP. 350 (1955); ScmVARTZ, op. cit. supra note 12, at 20; Spivack, Antitrust
Enforcement In The United States: A Primer, 37 CONN. B.J. 375, 381 (1963).
17 In recognition of these problems, the Department of Justice has no authority to
give advisory opinions. One objection raised to proposals that this policy be changed
is that any such advisory opinion would be of little value. It would have to be
limited to facts known at the time and would be "subject to revision in the light of
subsequent developments." ATr'y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 367 (1955).
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Department to police all potential abuses, and the Department often
has to rely upon the threat of criminal prosecution as a deterrent
to future violations.' Assuming that the defendants here were en-
gaged in a group boycott, decisions of the Supreme Court in 1958
and 1959 should have been sufficient to notify them that their con-
duct was suspect. 19 In fact, the civil complaint in the instant case
for an injunction alleged that the illegal activity dated from at
least 1947, whereas the criminal indictment alleged that the illegal
activity commenced in 1958.20
Reliance on Government inaction or silence, therefore, would
seem too equivocal in antitrust cases to sustain a finding of equitable
estoppel. The court's assertion that prosecution might impair pub-
lic confidence in government institutions seems to be more than
balanced by the public interest in enforcement of the antitrust
laws.&21
18 See Spivack, supra note 16, at 380.
10See Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211, 212 (1959);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); cf. United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948) (dictum).
20 See Memorandum In Support of Government's Motion For Reconsideration of
Decision, pp. 3-4; Memorandum of Defendant's In Opposition To Government's Mo-
tion For Reconsideration, pp. 5-6. The latter date would have been five or six years
after the alleged investigation.
21 Estoppel would seem particularly inapplicable where the Government seeks to
execute a policy affected with the public interest. See DAvis, ADMNISTRATIV LAW §
17.04 (1959). In suggesting the adoption of a statute providing for estoppel against
the Government, one author has stated that there are some laws which should not be
affected. He felt the antitrust laws in particular "have a history which militates
against this kind of reform." See Newman, Should Official Advice Be Reliable?-Pro-
posals As To Estoppel And Related Doctrines In Administrative Law, 53 COLM. L.
Rv. 374, 387 & n.70 (1953).
It has also been said that public policy would prohibit the enforcement of a
contract which violates the antitrust laws and that estoppel may not be invoked to
thwart those statutes. Standardbred Owners Ass'n v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 35 Misc.
2d 1081, 1083, 232 N.Y.S.2d 346, 350 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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